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Abstract—Our study analyzes the security and privacy properties of an implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD). Introduced to the U.S. market in 2003, this model of ICD includes
pacemaker technology and is designed to communicate wirelessly
with a nearby external programmer in the 175 kHz frequency
range. After partially reverse-engineering the ICD’s communications protocol with an oscilloscope and a software radio, we
implemented several software radio-based attacks that could
compromise patient safety and patient privacy. Motivated by
our desire to improve patient safety, and mindful of conventional
trade-offs between security and power consumption for resourceconstrained devices, we introduce three new zero-power defenses
based on RF power harvesting. Two of these defenses are humancentric, bringing patients into the loop with respect to the security
and privacy of their implantable medical devices (IMDs). Our
contributions provide a scientific baseline for understanding the
potential security and privacy risks of current and future IMDs,
and introduce human-perceptible and zero-power mitigation
techniques that address those risks. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the first in our community to use general-purpose
software radios to analyze and attack previously unknown radio
communications protocols.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Wirelessly reprogrammable implantable medical devices
(IMDs) such as pacemakers, implantable cardioverter defibrillators (ICDs), neurostimulators, and implantable drug pumps
use embedded computers and radios to monitor chronic disorders and treat patients with automatic therapies. For instance,
an ICD that senses a rapid heartbeat can administer an electrical shock to restore a normal heart rhythm, then later report
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this event to a health care practitioner who uses a commercial
device programmer1 with wireless capabilities to extract data
from the ICD or modify its settings without surgery. Between
1990 and 2002, over 2.6 million pacemakers and ICDs were
implanted in patients in the United States [19]; clinical trials
have shown that these devices significantly improve survival
rates in certain populations [18]. Other research has discussed
potential security and privacy risks of IMDs [1], [10], but we
are unaware of any rigorous public investigation into the observable characteristics of a real commercial device. Without
such a study, it is impossible for the research community to
assess or address the security and privacy properties of past,
current, and future devices. We address that gap in this paper
and, based on our findings, propose and implement several
prototype attack-mitigation techniques.
Our investigation was motivated by an interdisciplinary
study of medical device safety and security, and relied on
a diverse team of area specialists. Team members from
the security and privacy community have formal training
in computer science, computer engineering, and electrical
engineering. One team member from the medical community
is a practicing cardiologist with hundreds of pacemaker and
implantable defibrillator patients and was past chairperson
of the FDA’s Circulatory System Medical Device Advisory
Panel. Our technical contributions toward understanding and
improving the security, privacy, and safety of these devices
include: analyses; software radio-based methodologies; and
human-perceptible and zero-power (battery-free) defenses.
Overview of contributions. We assess the security and privacy properties of a common ICD and present attacks on
privacy, integrity, and availability. We show that the ICD
discloses sensitive information in the clear (unencrypted);
we demonstrate a reprogramming attack that changes the
operation of (and the information contained in) the ICD; and
1 The reader should not confuse the term “device programmer” with a person
who programs computers. The former is an external device that communicates
with and adjusts the settings on an IMD.
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we give evidence that a battery-powered ICD can be made
to communicate indefinitely with an unauthenticated device,
thereby posing a potential denial-of-service risk. All of our
attacks can be mounted by an unauthorized party equipped
with a specially configured radio communicator within range
of the ICD. In our experiments, we performed attacks from
distances up to several centimeters; we did not experiment
with increasing this range. We also present prototype defenses
against the attacks we describe.
Developing these attacks and defenses required some understanding of relevant devices and protocols. We give an
account of our attempts to reverse-engineer communications
to and from the ICD using a commercial ICD programmer
and a software radio; we believe that this work is the first in
our community to successfully use general purpose software
radios in the reverse engineering of wireless protocols for security analysis. Information directly available from RF signals,
given knowledge gained from reverse engineering, includes
patient information (such as name and diagnosis) and medical
telemetry (information about vital signs); we demonstrate this
breach of privacy by showing redacted transmissions. We
also demonstrate active attacks on device integrity wherein
an unauthorized software radio transmitter (or unauthorized
external programmer) that follows a certain protocol can
change information on the ICD, including therapy settings
that determine when the device should administer an electric
shock; the unauthorized radio transmitter can also make the
ICD issue a commanded electrical shock. Finally, we describe
our discovery that an attacker can keep an ICD in a state
of elevated energy consumption, thereby potentially depleting
battery life and threatening availability. Table I provides a
summary of our attacks and their implications.
With the above attacks in mind, we present prototype
defenses against them. Our defenses comprise three different
deterrence and prevention mechanisms that sit at the interface
between an ICD and the outside world. Our defenses do not
require battery power and therefore may require only minimal design changes to future implantable devices. We refer
to these mechanisms as zero-power defenses to emphasize
that they draw no energy from the primary battery, instead
harvesting RF energy from an external source. Zero-power
notification audibly warns a patient of security-sensitive events
and can help mitigate the risk of attacks both by outsiders
who have custom equipment (like our software radio-based
attack system) and by insiders who have access to commercial
ICD programmers. Zero-power authentication uses symmetric
cryptographic techniques to prevent unauthorized access; it
aims to protect against adversaries who have custom equipment. Finally, sensible security combines elements of zeropower notification and authentication by allowing patients
to physically sense an acoustic key exchange. We show the
effectiveness of these defenses by measuring the performance
of our prototype zero-power system, WISPer, which is a WISP
UHF RFID tag [25], [27] augmented with a piezo-element.
(Notationally, although WISPer is batteryless and is based
on RFID technologies, the term passive does not accurately

characterize the radio conversation that takes place.)
Our study examines a single Medtronic Maximo DR VVEDDDR model #7278 ICD. This model, introduced to the U.S.
market in 2003 [21], is a typical ICD: it incorporates pacemaking (steady, periodic electrical stimulation) and defibrillation
(single large shock) functions, and it communicates with an
external device programmer at a range of several centimeters.
Implications, challenges, and broader issues. Our study
focuses on a single ICD, and therefore provides only a small
snapshot in the evolution and breadth of ICD technologies
and more general implantable medical devices. Nevertheless,
we believe that this snapshot is necessary toward assessing
the current trajectory of IMD security and privacy. We hope
that the analyses and defenses presented in this paper will
motivate broader scientific investigations into how to best
provide security, privacy, safety, and effectiveness for future
implantable medical devices. Improving IMD security and
privacy is, however, significantly challenging due to rapidly
evolving threat models, trends toward longer-range wireless
communication, explorations into multi-agent systems of intercommunicating IMDs [4], [7], [33], and resource constraints
of an IMD’s battery, processor, and memory. Moreover, as we
previously observed [10], there is tension between security
(restricted access) and safety (open access in emergency
scenarios); the zero-power notification portion of our WISPer
prototype aims to address this tension.
Attack scenarios. Since health care is a very sensitive and
personal subject for many people, we explicitly choose to deviate from standard practice in the academic security research
community and do not describe specific scenarios in which an
attacker might compromise the privacy or health of a victim.
We also do not discuss the potential impact on patients if an
adversary were to carry out an attack in vivo. Rather, when
discussing attacks we focus solely on the technical properties
of those attacks. In addition, in each case where we identify a
vulnerability, we propose a solution or technical direction to
mitigate it.
Context. Pacemakers, ICDs, and other implantable medical
devices have improved and saved innumerable lives. To our
knowledge, no IMD patient has ever been harmed by a
malicious security attack. While our research demonstrates
that such a scenario is possible, our goals in conducting this
research are to: (1) demonstrate that IMD security and privacy
vulnerabilities exist; (2) propose solutions to the identified
weaknesses; (3) encourage the development of more robust
security and privacy features for IMDs; and (4) improve the
privacy and safety of IMDs for the millions of patients who
enjoy their benefits. This paper, which focuses on a single ICD
and our zero-power defenses, should be read in concert with
our previous work [10], which surveys the potential security
and privacy issues for broad classes of IMDs independent of
any particular IMD technology.
Disclosure. In light of the rapid advances and changes in ICD
technology, we conducted this scientific investigation with the
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Determine whether patient has an ICD
Determine what kind of ICD patient has
Determine ID (serial #) of ICD
Obtain private telemetry data from ICD
Obtain private information about patient history
Determine identity (name, etc.) of patient
Change device settings
Change or disable therapies
Deliver command shock

Commercial
programmer
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

Software radio
eavesdropper
4
4
4
4
4
4

Software radio
programmer
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

Primary
risk
Privacy
Privacy
Privacy
Privacy
Privacy
Privacy
Integrity
Integrity
Integrity

TABLE I
R ESULTS OF EXPERIMENTAL ATTACKS . A CHECK MARK INDICATES A SUCCESSFUL IN VITRO ATTACK .

goal of understanding and addressing the potential security
risks of ICDs before future ICDs and other IMDs become
more complex and the potential security and privacy risks to
patients increase. However, we also firmly believe in disclosing
this information in an ethical manner that fully considers the
well-being of patients. We specifically and purposefully omit
details that would allow someone to use this article as a guide
for creating attacks against ICDs.
Paper organization. Section II gives a brief introduction
to ICDs, describes the security model we consider in this
work, and summarizes related work. Section III discusses
the process of intercepting and reverse-engineering an ICD’s
wireless communications, beginning with RF signal analysis
and culminating in readable plaintext. Section IV discusses
replay attacks that compromise device integrity by changing
stored information or therapy settings. Section V extends the
discussion of zero-power defenses into the realm of device
design. Finally, Section VI offers concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND , M ODEL , AND R ELATED W ORK
This section summarizes the characteristics and medical
usage of a modern implantable cardioverter defibrillator. It also
introduces some of the equipment we used in our analyses.
Following this introduction, we construct a security model that
classifies potential adversaries in terms of their capabilities.
Finally, we summarize previous research that motivates and
informs the methods and results of this work.
A. Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs)
An implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) is a device
that monitors and responds to heart activity. ICDs have modes
for pacing, wherein the device periodically sends a small
electrical stimulus to the heart, and for defibrillation, wherein
the device sends a larger shock to restore normal heart rhythm.
A physician surgically implants the ICD below the patient’s
clavicle and close to the skin (Fig. 1). The physician also
implants electrical leads that connect the ICD to the heart
muscle. Post-surgery, a health care practitioner can use an
external programmer to perform diagnostics, read and write
private data, and adjust therapy settings. A malfunctioning or
maliciously configured ICD could harm a patient in multiple

Fig. 1. Chest xray image of an implanted ICD (top right, near shoulder,
solid outline) and electrical leads connected to heart chambers (center of rib
cage, dotted outline).

ways, including by inaction (failure to deliver treatment when
necessary) or by extraneous action such as a command shock
when the heart is beating normally.
Magnetic switch. Inside the ICD is a magnetic switch.
A magnetic field in proximity to this switch causes it to
close, which in turn causes the ICD to wirelessly transmit
telemetry data, including electrocardiogram (EKG) readings.
(We discovered, however, that we can activate transmission of
telemetry on our ICD solely with an RF command and without
the presence of a magnet; see Section IV.) In a clinical setting,
the magnetic field comes from a magnet in the programming
head, which is the component of the programmer that is placed
in proximity to a patient’s implanted ICD. At the surface of
one programming head we measured this magnet at 700 gauss.
Wireless communications. Our ICD wirelessly communicates
with the external programmer using the 175 kHz band, which
is intended for short-range communications. Newer ICDs
can communicate at both the 175 kHz frequency and in
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the 402–405 MHz Medical Implant Communications (MICS)
band [26], the latter intended for longer-range communications. One motivation for incorporating longer-range communications in new ICDs is that doing so provides greater
flexibility in both clinical and home settings; for example,
a patient’s ICD could transmit data to an at-home monitor
while the patient sleeps. (The specific communication ranges
in Section I and throughout this paper are for the commercial
ICD programmers we used in our experiments. We did not
experiment with increasing the communications ranges of the
ICDs.)
Diversity in IMDs. When considering implantable medical
device security and privacy, it is important to draw distinctions between classes of devices that have different physical
properties and healthcare goals. This paper discusses ICDs and
pacemakers together because they are common devices with
overlapping functions and similar operating environments.
Designers of IMDs make design decisions based in part
on the fundamental properties of the problems the devices
address. Some IMDs, like modern ICDs and pacemakers, are
entirely self-contained with respect to power and connectivity. They are designed to last for several years, use nonrechargeable internal batteries, and have no physical connections (e.g., tubes) outside the body. Other IMDs with computational capabilities are more exposed, like cochlear implants,
and are designed to last for the patient’s entire lifetime. Such
devices might utilize externally worn, rechargeable batteries
or, like insulin pumps, might have tubes leading outside the
patient. These external channels and recharging requirements
could potentially make such devices susceptible to human
error. While non-computational implantable devices exist, such
as artificial joints, this paper considers only those IMDs that
have computational capabilities.
B. Security Model
Our research focuses on evaluating and improving the security and privacy of communication between ICDs and external
ICD programmers. We consider attacks by three classes of
adversaries (see also Table I):
•

An adversary with a commercial ICD programmer, i.e.,
an external device commercially produced and marketed
for use with ICDs. At least for the programmers with
which we have experimented, there are no technological
mechanisms in place to ensure that programmers can be
operated only by authorized personnel.

•

A passive adversary who eavesdrops on communications
between the ICD and a commercial programmer. This adversary can record RF messages output by ICDs and programmers. This adversary might use standard or custombuilt equipment, including oscilloscopes, software radios,
amplifiers, and directional antennas.

•

An active adversary who extends the passive adversary
with the ability to generate arbitrary RF traffic, not necessarily conforming to the expected modulation schemes
or FCC regulations. This attacker may interfere with

legitimate transactions or create spurious ones by, e.g.,
spoofing a commercial programmer.
For the purposes of this research we assume that ICDs are honest and that they attempt to follow the protocols as specified;
we do not experiment with adversarial actions that employ
(possibly fake) ICDs to compromise or otherwise adversely
affect the operation of commercial programmers.
C. Related Work
Past research has investigated the challenges of manufacturing and providing safe computer-based medical treatments
in the presence of unintentional failures (e.g., accidents in
radiation treatments from the Therac-25 [16]). Our work from
the perspective of security and privacy investigates how to
provide safety and effectiveness in the presence of intentional
failures. In the more general study of medical device security,
some research focuses on securing patient data in a medical
database [22]. Work by Venkatasubramanian and Gupta [31]
has focused on pervasive health care security, including security involving medical sensors. Our earlier work [10] surveys
a wide range of IMD security issues, including the need
to balance IMD security and privacy goals with safety and
effectiveness goals. In contrast, our current study is based on
the systematic and pragmatic analysis of the security of a real,
commercial device.
There is also a body of research studying wireless security
in low-power environments, especially in the areas of sensor
networks [13], [23] and wireless body area networks [32]. In
contrast with these works, our zero-power security approaches
eliminate the stored-energy overhead of cryptography. Chae et
al. [2] also used RF power to implement RC5 on the WISP;
we leverage their work in the context of medical devices and
extend it with the new techniques of zero-power notification
and zero-power human-sensible key exchange. A separate approach to our sensible key exchange uses physiological values
as keys [3]. The notion of plaintext key exchange via physical
contact appears in work by Stajano and Anderson [29]. Our
work extends that notion by allowing key exchange to occur
over an acoustic, rather than an electrical, channel.
Previous research, such as that of Goodrich et al. [8] and
McCune et al. [20], considered cryptographic operations, like
key agreement and authentication, that involved human action
directed by sensory input. Our work sets a different goal,
namely patient notification as a side-effect of a cryptographic
operation, and accomplishes it through a combination of
auditory and tactile feedback.
Finally, there is work using software radios to receive
transmissions from commercial wireless protocols, such as
BlueSniff [28] and the A5 Cracking Project [15]. Our work
further demonstrates the utility of software radios by using
them to help reverse-engineer and then participate in previously unknown radio protocols. Earlier work that analyzed
radio transmissions of RFID-enabled credit cards [11] relied
on similar reverse-engineering techniques, but the radio was
built on a Gumstix embedded Linux system rather than on the
general-purpose Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP).
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Transmissions from the programmer. In reverse-engineering
the programmer’s transmissions, we had an advantage: a
serial connection between the programmer device and the
programming head carries the raw bits to be transmitted. By
tapping this serial connection we were able to obtain these bits
for comparison with the encoded and modulated RF signals
output by the programmer’s radio.
Through spectral analysis of the programmer’s RF transmissions, we determined that it uses binary frequency shift
keying (2-FSK) as its modulation scheme. We confirmed this
by demodulating bits from the RF trace and comparing the
results to the raw bits we collected on the serial line; we
found them to be identical. We also determined via standard
techniques that the length of a single symbol transmitted by
the programmer is 14 cycles of the center frequency, making
the symbol rate 12.5 kBd (i.e., 12 500 symbols per second).
Fig. 2. Equipment used in our experiments. At top is a 4 GSa/s oscilloscope.
At bottom, from left to right, are: our eavesdropping antenna, an ICD, our
transmitting antenna (mounted on cardboard), and a USRP with a BasicTX
card attached.

III. I NTERCEPTING ICD C OMMUNICATIONS
We combined several reverse-engineering and eavesdropping techniques to intercept, understand, and extract information from the communications between our ICD and a
commercial programmer. Our results show that wireless transmissions disclose private data.
We used two hardware tools to intercept the radio frequency
(RF) signals emitted by the ICD and the programmer: a recording oscilloscope and a Universal Software Radio Peripheral
(USRP) [5]. The oscilloscope is standard lab equipment; the
USRP is a programmable device that interacts with opensource GNU Radio [30] libraries on a host PC. Section III-D1
describes the equipment in more detail and Fig. 2 shows a
picture.

Transmissions from the ICD. Reverse-engineering the ICD’s
transmissions was more difficult because we did not have
access to a wire carrying raw bits. However, we knew that
the ICD transmits certain stored information, so we inserted
information in the ICD using the programmer (by, for example, setting the patient name to a string of ‘A’s). We
analyzed the RF signal to identify phase shift-keyed bits and,
using our cribbed patient name, learned that the ICD uses a
modulation scheme known as differential binary phase shift
keying (DBPSK). We also determined that the symbol length
of ICD transmissions is two cycles of the carrier wave, making
the symbol rate 87.5 kBd.
Decoding. When we attempted to decode the demodulated
symbols, we looked for the cribs (known plaintexts) we had
inserted. We observed that transmissions from both ICD and
programmer are encoded under Non-Return-to-Zero Inverted
(NRZI) with bit stuffing. Section III-D2 explains this encoding
scheme and Fig. 5 shows an example of NRZI decoding.
B. Eavesdropping with a Commodity Software Radio

We began by capturing RF transmissions around 175 kHz.
Using an oscilloscope, we were trivially able to identify transmissions from our ICD and the commercial ICD programmer.
We saved traces from both the oscilloscope and the USRP. We
processed these RF traces in software (using Matlab and the
GNU Radio toolchain) to recover symbols, then bits. Finally,
by analyzing these bits we discovered key aspects of the ICD’s
protocols and the data that it and the programmer transmit.

We built an eavesdropper using the Universal Software
Radio Peripheral (USRP) in concert with the open source GNU
Radio libraries. For the initial analysis in Section III-A, we
simply used programs included with GNU Radio to capture
and store received radio signals, then wrote code in Matlab
and Perl to analyze those signals. To eavesdrop in real time,
we integrated the necessary functions back into the C++ and
Python framework of GNU Radio. This section describes the
eavesdropping process in detail and shows the results of our
passive attacks.

The physical layer. Before we could analyze protocols at the
application layer, we needed to determine the data bits that
corresponded to the raw electromagnetic signals in the traces
we obtained with the oscilloscope and USRP. For completeness, Section III-D2 discusses radio terminology and describes
the process of extracting bits from RF traces. We determined
that the ICD and the programmer share an encoding scheme
but use different modulation schemes. Fig. 3 shows segments
of the transmissions we examined.

Establishing a transaction timeline. Our first step toward
understanding where and when to eavesdrop was to establish
a timeline for bidirectional conversations between the ICD
and the programmer; this timeline is shown in Fig. 4. We
established the timeline by interacting with the programmer
and capturing programmer and ICD transmissions on an
oscilloscope. We did not need to decipher these transmissions;
we were able to infer their meanings and some of their contents
by observing the order in which the programmer acquired

A. Reverse-Engineering Transmissions
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Fig. 3. Demodulating received programmer (left) and ICD transmissions. The top plot in each figure shows the phase of the raw RF signal, downconverted
from 175 kHz to baseband. Both 2-FSK and DBPSK encode data by the phase change of the signal, pictured in the middle row. The final row shows the
decoded bits: in 2-FSK the bit is determined by the sign of the phase change, and in DBPSK by whether it is closer to 0 or π. Note that there are fewer bits
than samples; our 500 kHz sampling rate generates 40 samples per programmer symbol and about 6 per ICD symbol.

ICD
Magnetic
field
introduced

Telemetry
ACK

...
Auto-ID

Patient
data

Model,
Serial #

Interrogate

...

Response

Command

...
ICD
Programmer

Fig. 4. Timeline of a conversation between an ICD programmer and an ICD. If a programmer is present it will acknowledge each packet automatically.
When told by an operator to do so, the programmer asks the ICD for identifying information, which the ICD provides. The programmer then interrogates the
ICD for patient data, which the ICD provides. Other commands (such as ICD programming commands) and their responses follow.

information about the ICD. We used the timeline to determine
which transmissions to inspect using GNU Radio and our own
tools.
Using GNU Radio. One builds a GNU Radio program by
assembling digital signal processing blocks into an information
flow graph that connects a source to a sink. If a suitable
hardware device such as a USRP is attached, source and
sink blocks can represent radio interface cards. Intermediate
blocks perform signal and data processing steps. Because
transmissions from ICDs and ICD programmers differ greatly
in amplitude, because their modulation schemes differ, and
because we wanted to assess our ability to eavesdrop on the
two sides separately, we developed a slightly different GNU
Radio receiver for each end. See Section III-D3 for more
details regarding one of those receivers.
An example illustrates the relative ease with which one
can develop a GNU Radio block: while inspecting demodulated and decoded traces in search of patterns, we discovered byte sequences that appeared to be packet delimiters (1000000 for end-of-packet and 1111110000001
for beginning-of-packet). We built a GNU Radio block to

packetize bitstreams and gather data about the resulting
packets. This block is logically simple and was adapted
from similar functionality in the GNU Radio library. The
complexity of this change was modest: we removed 87 of
166 total lines of C++ code (discounting comments and
whitespace) from gr.correlate_access_code_bb and
gr.framer_sink_1, and added 44 lines of code. For
perspective, the C++ source files for the other blocks used
in this receiver contain roughly 1600 lines of code, mostly
implementing signal processing operations.
Intercepting Patient Data. Analysis of our captures via
the reverse engineering process described in Section III-A
revealed several things. First, we were able to find cleartext
representations of a wide range of what would have been
patient data in captured transmissions. (We experimented with
artificial patient data that we stored on the ICD; we did not
experiment with real patient data.) Even without knowledge
of the semantics of the packet format, these data are easily
extractable.
From this we conclude that this model of ICD programmer
and this model of ICD do not protect their transmissions cryp-
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tographically against disclosure when communicating with
each other. The personal data transmitted in cleartext include
the patient’s name, date of birth, medical ID number2 , and
patient history. Equally easy to find are the name and phone
number of the treating physician, the dates of ICD and lead
implantation (which may differ), the model, and the serial
number of the ICD and leads. This list is not exhaustive;
we observed other items of personally identifying data being
transmitted in cleartext. All this information is sent either in
the clear or in inverted form from the ICD to the programmer
during interrogation. Furthermore, for the fields we manipulated via reprogramming attempts, these fields are sent in the
clear from the programmer to the ICD.
Intercepting Telemetry. Our ICD begins to broadcast telemetry data in cleartext as soon as a magnetic field of sufficient
strength is introduced. We activated telemetry with a magnet
we measured at 700 gauss by placing it within 5 cm of the
ICD. Telemetry transmissions, sent over the 175 kHz FM
band at a rate of 32 packets per second in our experiments,
contain representations of a patient’s electrocardiogram (EKG)
readings; these readings convey heart rate and other potentially
private information about the patient’s cardiac activity in real
time. We determined this information leak with a knownplaintext attack on ICD telemetry in which we attached a
function generator to one of the ICD’s sensing ports with the
voltage set larger than that generated by a real heart. Feeding
the device a predictable signal (in place of a heartbeat), we
were then able to observe the same period in the payloads
of the ICD telemetry packets. Varying the period of the input
resulted in a change of the output frequency to match, and
in the absence of our input the telemetry data appeared as
aperiodic binary noise (values from 0x00 to 0x03).
C. Limitations
Because our goal was to assess disclosure of private data,
we did not fully reverse-engineer the communication protocol;
rather, we inspected captured traffic and learned where to look
for certain cribs. In particular, we were not always able to
predict the value of a certain field which we believed to be
a checksum. Another field appeared to be a sequence number
that increased according to a rule we did not fully investigate.
As evidenced by the ICD programmer’s many (more than
10 screens) informational displays and data graphs, the ICD
transmits a large amount of information to the programmer.
We looked for cribs that we expected to see encoded under
fairly predictable schemes (e.g., ASCII). We did not attempt
to map all of the fields shown in the programmer’s menus to
their counterparts in the radio transmissions.
We do not provide an estimate of the upper bound on
communication distance, as this distance is sensitive to many
factors that are beyond the scope of this paper. Without an
amplifier or any other specialized hardware, we were able to
2 A medical ID number need not be globally unique; it is assigned according
to the policy of the hospital and may, in some cases, serve as an index into
a database of patient records.

eavesdrop on both the ICD and the ICD programmer from a
distance of several centimeters.
D. Auxiliary Information
This section provides supplementary information about our
equipment, our reverse engineering of the physical layer, and
our programming of software radios. The reader can view this
section as the appendix to Section III. Skipping this section
should not affect one’s understanding of the core contents of
this paper.
1) Equipment: Capturing RF packets requires equipment
capable of operation at the relevant frequency bands — in
our case, an antenna tuned to 175 kHz. We achieved our best
results with an antenna that we removed from an explanted
pacemaker and an antenna that we removed from a Medtronic
Carelink device (model 2490C). We also performed successful
eavesdropping experiments using a homemade, hand-wound,
ferrite core antenna and even a simple closed loop made by
joining the grabbers of an oscilloscope probe. We used the
same antennas for our replay attacks, sometimes in combination with an amplifier; once again, we achieved our best
results with the antennas removed from the pacemaker and
the Carelink device.
The oscilloscope eavesdropping setup is trivial: the oscilloscope samples the voltage on an attached eavesdropping antenna at regular time intervals, and we store these
hTime, Voltagei pairs to disk for later offline processing. The
oscilloscope proved very useful in our research; however, its
limited memory meant that we could record only about eight
seconds of RF communication at a time, which was insufficient
for recording an entire conversation between our ICD and
programmer.
Because of the oscilloscope’s limited memory depth, we
also used a Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) [5] in
our analysis. The USRP is a single board containing an FPGA
for fast signal processing and swappable radio interface cards
called daughterboards. We used a BasicRX daughterboard,
suitable for low-frequency communication, to interface with
our eavesdropping antenna. The USRP records signals as
complex I/Q samples, which are interconvertible with the
data format used by the oscilloscope. The daughterboards and
FPGA perform RF conversion in hardware and stream the
results to the PC. The USRP can sample at a rate of up to
8 MHz (32 MB/s) over a time range limited only by hard
drive capacity; we performed the majority of our experiments
using this setup with a sampling rate of 500 kHz.
2) Reverse-Engineering the Physical Layer: Two key processes are used in transmission of data over RF: encoding
and modulation. Encoding is the process used to convert data
bits into radio symbols, and modulation determines how the
hardware varies the carrier radio wave to transmit those symbols. In order to receive data, a receiver must first demodulate
and then decode using the respective schemes. In RF systems
with asymmetric hardware constraints, such as with ICDs
and programmers, it is not uncommon for transmissions from
different devices to use different modulations and encodings.
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We found that this is indeed the case for the programmer and
the ICD.
To collect RF data, we connected one of our antennas to
a recording device (oscilloscope or USRP), then placed the
antenna in close proximity to the ICD and programmer as they
communicated wirelessly. We determined that the modulation
scheme used by the programmer is binary frequency shift
keying (2-FSK). In 2-FSK, the programmer encodes symbols
by transmitting at a different frequency for each symbol state.
In this case, 150 kHz and 200 kHz respectively represent the
two possible states.
The ICD uses a different modulation scheme, differential
binary phase shift keying (DBPSK), in which the two possible
symbols are represented by transmission at the same frequency
but opposite phase. DBPSK is a common modulation scheme
for resource-constrained devices because it remains robust
when the transmitting oscillator is inaccurate. Such oscillator
variability is often observed in low-power devices that save
energy by partially or fully disabling RF circuitry when it
is not needed. One technique a device like an ICD may
employ is to turn off the synchronization circuitry that keeps
the RF carrier frequency accurate between transmissions. We
observed some evidence of this method in the ICD we studied.
Fig. 5 shows the symbols we obtained by demodulating
part of a packet from a programmer transmission in which
the programmer issues commands to the ICD to change the
stored patient name to AA AAAA. As can be seen in row (a),
different patterns of symbols can be used to express the same
pattern of bits. For example, 111111011 and 000000100
can both correspond to ASCII ‘A’. In determining the encoding
scheme, we experimented with several common binary line
code schemes (e.g., Manchester). By searching for the known
plaintext crib of the patient name, we ultimately determined
that both programmer and ICD transmissions are encoded in
NRZI (Non-Return-to-Zero Inverted) form with bit stuffing.
In NRZI encoding, zero bits are represented by no change in
symbol over one symbol period, and one bits are represented
by a change of symbol state. Bit stuffing is a common
technique (used in the USB standard, for example) in which
data containing the end-of-frame delimiter (EFD) is broken
up by the insertion of an extra bit to allow their transmission
without prematurely ending the frame.
3) Programming the Software Radio: Fig. 6 gives the block
diagram of our eavesdropper for ICD programmer transmissions. Complex samples are streamed from the USRP with
BasicRX daughterboard to the PC via USB, then output by the
gr.usrp_source_c block. The frequency demodulation
block gr.blks.fm_demod_cf computes the frequency
shift of the incoming signal and finds the correct sampling interval for each signal. These symbols, in the form of frequency
shifts, are mapped to bits by gr.binary_slicer_fb, and
the bits are NRZI-decoded using gr.diff_decode_bb.
This functionality is implemented entirely with existing blocks
built into the GNU Radio library. Finally, the resultant bits are
framed as packets by our imd.sink_175 block, which we
adapted from code in the GNU Radio library.

For active attacks, as for passive attacks, we employ several of GNU Radio’s standard signal processing blocks. A
gr.file_source block streams complex samples from a
file on disk. These are processed by an imd_clean_fmmod
block of our own design (80 lines of C++) which separates
programmer transmissions from background noise and ICD
transmissions, then generates a clean FM-modulated signal
carrying the exact same data. The clean signal is amplified
in software and then streamed into usrp.sink_c, which
passes the signal to the USRP for transmission over the air.
IV. ACTIVE ATTACKS WITH A C OMMODITY S OFTWARE
R ADIO
We implemented several active attacks using the USRP and
a BasicTX daughterboard to transmit on the 175 kHz band.
Because the BasicTX card lacks built-in amplification, we
also interposed a simple RF amplifier circuit for many of our
replay attempts. With amplification, we were able to mount
active attacks across an air gap of several centimeters; we did
not attempt further amplification or longer distances. Without
amplification, we successfully mounted selected replay attacks
with the antenna from a Carelink device within one cm of the
ICD. Additionally, during the course of our experiments, the
ICD entered its elective replacement indicator (ERI) mode,
which normally indicates to physicians that ICD replacement
should be scheduled. We successfully mounted all of our
replay attacks before and after the ICD entered this mode.
All of our active attacks fall into the category of replay
attacks: only simple waveform manipulation and repetition
— not packet analysis or reassembly — were necessary.
Creating a software radio programmer capable of emulating
all the functions of a commercial programmer would require
additional reverse engineering; we chose instead to focus on
attacks that are both significant and illuminating (in particular,
those that violate confidentiality, integrity, or availability) and
that pose minimal complexity to adversaries.
A. Replay Attacks
For simplicity, our replay attack technique is transmit-only:
we did not attempt to synchronize replayed programmer packets with the ICD’s response packets. The penalty we paid as a
result was that each successful replay attack was preceded by
zero or more unsuccessful attempts. It was generally sufficient
to set the ICD to a known state, replay the desired transmission
in a loop for several minutes, and then re-evaluate the resulting
state of the ICD. This process allowed us to determine whether
one or more replays were successful but did not reveal the
precise number of successes. The transmissions we replayed
varied in length from one second to 37.7 seconds. We did not
attempt to optimize our attacks by removing silent periods
from the replayed traces. Each of our replay attacks targeted
only the ICD against which we recorded the original trace.
In order to rule out the possibility that proximity of the
magnet in the programming head is necessary for the ICD to
accept programming commands, we tested each replay attack
with and without a magnet near the ICD. In all cases, both
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(a)
(b)
(c)

101010100000001|...|000000100|111111011|000000100|111111011|...|1111111
_11111110000001|...|100000x10|100000x10|100000x10|100000x10|...|1000000
------SFD-----A
A
A
A
--EFD--

Fig. 5. Part of a sample programmer transmission containing the crib text AAAA. Row (a) represents the demodulated bits, (b) are the NRZI-decoded bits,
and (c) are the bits rendered as ASCII. The Start-of-Frame and End-of-Frame Delimiters pictured mark the beginning and end of each packet.

Software Radio

FM demodulator

Binary Slicer

Differential (NRZI)
decoder

Programmer
packet sink

gr.usrp_source_c

gr.blks.fm_demod_cf

gr.binary_slicer_fb

gr.diff_decode_bb

imd.sink_175

Fig. 6. Architecture of a GNU Radio-based eavesdropper. The purpose and Python class name of each signal processing block is included, as well as the
format of the data it processes. All blocks but the last are from GNU Radio’s built-in block library. We adapted the last block, our imd.sink_175 packet
framer, from built-in GNU Radio blocks.

scenarios were successful. We conducted all of our active
attacks with our commercial programmer turned off.
Triggering ICD identification. We performed several experiments in which we replayed a 1.5-second auto-identification
trace we had recorded from the programmer. Each of these
transmissions resulted in an identical response from the ICD,
disclosing the ICD’s presence and several details about the
device such as its model and serial number. As the autoidentification command is the first set of packets sent by a
programmer in a normal session, our experiments suggest that
no prior synchronization is required for a successful exchange
as long as the programmer transmits during ICD radio silence.
Disclosing patient data. After the auto-identification step, the
programmer asks the ICD for the rest of the information stored
on it, including patient data. We used GNU Radio to replay
a 26-second capture containing both an auto-identification
command and the interrogation command that elicits the more
detailed data. Using the demodulation and framing code described in Section III-A, we confirmed that the ICD responded
to our interrogation command with the same response it gave
to the ICD programmer’s original command. This response
includes personal information such as patient name, diagnosis,
and many other details.
Disclosing cardiac data. We observed that certain conditions
cause the ICD to send periodic telemetry transmissions at a
rate of 32 packets per second. If a sufficiently strong magnet
is near the ICD, the ICD appears to transmit telemetry indefinitely. When the strong magnet is taken away (as when the
programming head is removed from the patient’s skin), these
transmissions stop after 10 seconds. However, introducing a
magnet is not the only way to elicit telemetry transmissions
from the ICD. We observed that replaying certain sections
of recorded conversations, in particular the beginning of the
interrogation command sequence, caused the ICD to emit
packets for several seconds after the end of the replay. We
hypothesize that an attacker could replay these commands in
a tight loop to elicit continual telemetry from the ICD.
Changing patient name. Medical personnel can learn a
patient’s name by interrogating an ICD. We used GNU Radio

to replay traces in which the programmer changes the patient
name stored on the ICD. After ten (on average) replays of
the same trace, more than one of which may have succeeded,
we used the programmer to confirm that we had successfully
changed the patient name stored on the ICD. We repeated this
experiment several times, each time changing the name to a
different value and confirming the change on the programmer.
Setting the ICD’s clock. The ICD programmer and the ICD
have separate clocks. The ICD’s clock allows it to record
timestamps in its event log and can be set from a menu on
the programmer. We used GNU Radio to replay traces in
which the programmer sets the time or date on the ICD. We
then confirmed in a new programming session that we had
successfully set the ICD’s clock. As with the patient name
change, this attack succeeded after an average of ten replays,
more than one of which may have succeeded.
Changing therapies. Therapies are the ICD’s responses to
cardiac events. A commercial programmer can be used to
enable and personalize therapies for an individual patient’s
medical needs or to disable (i.e., turn off) the device’s lifesaving functions. We used GNU Radio to replay captures
in which the programmer turns off therapies. With therapies
turned off, the ICD does not respond to potentially dangerous
cardiac conditions. After 24 replay attempts, more than one
of which may have succeeded, we confirmed in a new programming session that we had successfully disabled all of the
therapies we had enabled before our attempts.
Inducing fibrillation. During implantation surgery, it is common for a physician to test the newly implanted ICD to
ensure that it can both sense and appropriately treat a cardiac
condition known as ventricular fibrillation (V-Fib), one of the
most common kinds of heart rhythm problems. Accordingly,
the ICD has several testing modes in which it can induce VFib. Such a test — called an electrophysiological (EP) study
— is normally conducted with cardiologists standing by to
stop the fibrillation if the ICD fails to do so. After a physician
puts the programmer in EP study mode, sets certain study
parameters, and explicitly confirms that the study should begin,
the programmer sends the ICD a sequence of commands that
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requests a low-energy (∼1 joule) command shock to be applied
to the patient’s heart at a precise point in the patient’s cardiac
rhythm, with the goal of inducing V-Fib. When its automatic
therapies are enabled, the ICD should immediately detect and
treat the fibrillation by delivering the proper therapy.
We introduced a 100 Ω resistor between two of the ICD’s labeled defibrillation ports to measure the voltage applied during
a command shock. We then used our commercial programmer
to conduct an EP study in which we sent a 1.0 J shock from
one defibrillation port to the other across the resistor. Using
our oscilloscope, we measured the pulse’s peak voltage at
an average of 138.4 V over three trials. We then replayed
a recording of the EP study command sequence via our
software radio. At least three of 30 replay attempts succeeded
in causing similar voltage spikes, averaging 137.7 V. Besides
observing voltage spikes on the oscilloscope, we confirmed
that the ICD’s last high-voltage therapy field, shown in a
programmer menu, changed to reflect the date and time of
our last successful attack. We successfully triggered command
shocks via replayed commands even after turning off all of the
ICD’s automatic therapies.
The commercial programmer’s user interface provides safeguards to make it difficult for a physician to accidentally issue
a command shock when the ICD’s therapies are disabled.
Our successful replay attacks demonstrate that although these
safeguards are implemented in the programmer’s software, an
adversary who bypasses the commercial programmer using
a software radio could circumvent these safeguards. The
broader lesson is that external devices such as commercial
programmers should not be considered part of an IMD’s
trusted computing base. Additionally, we argue that if any
IMD exhibits a test procedure T for some property P , and
if there are no medical reasons for conducting procedure T
other than testing property P , then it should be impossible to
trigger T unless P is enabled. For example, as our experiments
suggest, if P is the efficacy of the device when therapies are
enabled and T is a test, then the ICD — not only the external
programmer — should verify that therapies are enabled prior
to conducting the test T .
Power denial of service attack. Our experiments suggest
that the ICD could be forced to remain in a mode in which
it continually engages in wireless communications. As we
discuss above, a strong magnetic field causes the ICD to
transmit telemetry continually, and the ICD responds to RF
commands without the presence of a nearby magnet. We have
not measured the power consumed by telemetry or other RF
transmissions, but it is possible that these operations decrease
battery life faster than normal ICD operation alone.
Other attack vectors. As noted in our earlier work [1],
[10], there may be other attack vectors against IMDs, such as
insecure software updates or buffer overflow vulnerabilities.
We do not experiment with such attack vectors in this work,
but note that the existence of such exploitable vulnerabilities
could allow for further adversarial control over the state and
operation of an IMD.

V. Z ERO -P OWER AND S ENSIBLE D EFENSES FOR IMD
S ECURITY AND P RIVACY
Providing security and privacy on an IMD involves health
risk factors and tight resource constraints. Traditional approaches could potentially introduce new hazards to patient
safety. For instance, protecting an IMD with a cryptographic
key may provide security, but the unavailability of a key could
hinder treatment in emergency situations. Another risk to IMD
availability is excessive power consumption by mechanisms
other than those needed for the device’s primary function.
For instance, the energy cost of performing computation for
cryptography or radio communication could directly compete
with the energy demands of pacing and defibrillation. Effective
mechanisms for security and privacy should not provide new
avenues for an unauthorized person to drain a device’s battery.
For instance, spurious wake-ups or a cryptographic authentication process itself could cause a device to enter a state that
consumes excessive amounts of energy (as in, e.g., the sleep
deprivation torture attacks of Stajano and Anderson [29]).
Therefore, three goals guided our design of zero-power
approaches for IMD security and privacy. First, an effective approach should either prevent or deter attacks by both malicious
outsiders with custom equipment and insiders with commercial
programmers. Because IMD therapies rely on long-lasting
batteries, a second goal is that security and privacy should
draw no power from the primary battery, thus preventing denial
of service attacks on power. Third, security-sensitive events
should be effortlessly detectable by the patient. We must also
ensure that new security mechanisms do not introduce new
failure modes.
Our contributions include three zero-power defenses and
prototype implementations, one of which we evaluated for
effectiveness in a substance approximating the radio properties
of human tissue. Zero-power notification harvests induced RF
energy to wirelessly power a piezo-element that audibly alerts
the patient of security-sensitive events at no cost to the battery.
Zero-power authentication similarly harvests RF energy to
power a cryptographically strong protocol that authenticates
requests from an external device programmer. Finally, sensible
key exchange combines techniques from both zero-power
notification and zero-power authentication for vibration-based
key distribution that a patient can sense through audible and
tactile feedback. While we implemented prototypes of our
proposed defenses, we did not incorporate our prototypes into
a real IMD. (We use the term zero-power only to emphasize
that no expenditure of energy from the primary battery is
necessary. Zero-power defenses are also a step beyond the
use of a secondary battery for security-only or other auxiliary
purposes.)
We do not claim that our defenses are final designs that IMD
manufacturers should immediately incorporate into commercial IMDs. Rather, we believe that our research establishes a
potential foundation upon which others can create, evaluate,
and implement new defensive mechanisms for future IMD
designs.
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Fig. 7.

The WISP with attached piezo-element.

A. Detection: Zero-Power Notification for Patients
As our earlier work notes [10], it may be possible to
deter malicious activities by making patients aware of those
activities. Our zero-power notification alerts a patient to potentially malicious activities both by insiders using commercial
programmers and by outsiders using custom attack hardware,
thereby making patients effortlessly aware of remote communications. On some modern ICDs, triggering the magnetic
switch causes the ICD to beep. Whether intentional or not,
such beeping represents a step towards the concept of patient
awareness by way of audible alerts. But beeps triggered by a
magnet alone do not raise patient awareness for RF-initiated
actions, which our approach does.
Our approach: WISPer. Our prototype of zero-power notification wirelessly drives a piezo-element that can audibly warn
a patient of security-sensitive events. The prototype builds
upon revision 1.0 of the Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform (WISP) [27], a postage stamp-sized embedded
system that contains RFID circuitry and a Texas Instruments
MSP430F1232 microcontroller with 256 bytes of RAM and
8 KBytes of flash memory. The WISP harvests energy from
a 915 MHz RF signal generated by the Alien ALR-9640
nanoscanner, a UHF RFID reader running the EPC Class
1 Gen 1 protocol. Although we prototyped at 915 MHz, it
may be possible to create similar hardware that operates at
the frequency of current ICD programmers. WISPer adds to
the WISP’s base code a 30-line C program that activates
a piezo-element which we attached to the general-purpose
I/O (GPIO) ports of the WISP. After WISPer receives a
sequence of wireless requests from the RFID reader, it emits
constant chirping, thereby informing the patient of the wireless
interaction. A future version of WISPer could set a separate
GPIO high after buzzing for a certain number of cycles, and
the IMD could allow remote communications only after that
GPIO is raised. WISPer satisfies our zero-power notification
design constraints: it draws no energy from a battery and can
issue alerts for all reprogramming activity.
Evaluation. Two measurements quantify the effectiveness of
the WISPer prototype for zero-power notification. We used
a sound level meter to measure Sound Pressure Level (SPL)
with a reference pressure of 20 micropascals (the standard
for above-water calculations). The buzzing volume peaked at
67 dB SPL from a distance of 1 m. For reference, a normal

conversation is about 60 dB SPL and a vacuum cleaner at a
distance of 3 meters is about 70 dB SPL [17]. We then placed
our prototype in an environment designed to simulate implantation in a human (Fig. 8). We implanted the device beneath
1 cm (a standard ICD implantation depth) of bacon, with 4 cm
of 85% lean ground beef packed underneath. We took several
readings at the surface of tissue in order to ascertain the effects
of obstruction by tissue. We measured 84 dB SPL of sound
at the surface of the tissue, and subjectively were easily able
to hear it from a meter away (more than the distance between
standard ICD implantation sites and a patient’s ear).
These tests of our prototype device suggest that its piezoelement is audible under reasonable simulations. Because
malicious attackers may attempt their attacks in noisy, chaotic
environments to vitiate auditory notification, and because some
patients with ICDs may have limited hearing, we note that
a piezo-element can be used to produce vibration instead of
audible sound. In our experiments, the 4 kHz alert used was
easily sensed by touch.
B. Prevention: Zero-Power Authentication
Our second defense implements a zero-power method that
allows an IMD to verify that it is communicating with a real
commercial programmer (and not an unauthorized software
radio programmer).
Approach. The device implements a simple challengeresponse protocol (Fig. 10) based on RC5-32/12/16 [24]. In
this model, all commercial programmers know a master key
KM , each IMD has an serial number or identity I, and each
IMD has an IMD-specific key K = f (KM , I), where f is
any cryptographically strong pseudorandom function (such as
AES). The value KM should be stored in secure hardware
on the programmers. The protocol works as follows. The
programmer transmits a request to authenticate to the WISP.
The WISP responds with its identity I and a nonce N .
The programmer computes K = f (KM , I) to get the IMDspecific key and then returns the response R = RC5(K, N )
to the WISP. The WISP computes the same value and verifies
the value it received from the programmer against its result.
The WISP finally sets a GPIO high which, if attached to or
built into a real IMD, would inform the IMD that the WISP
successfully authenticated a programmer.
For the sake of simplicity, our prototype does not implement
the full protocol. Namely, in our experiments we use a fixed
nonce and assume that the programmer knows the nonce
in advance. Using this simplified model, we experimentally
verified that, upon receiving the programmer response R, the
WISP was able to perform its own RC5 encryption and verify
equality. We were able to run this subset of the protocol with
complete reliability using only harvested energy. To lift from
the simplified model to a real implementation of our protocol,
we note that the nonce should appear random to an adversary.
Since we, and others [2], show that it is possible to run RC5
on a WISP, a natural solution would be to generate the nonce
with RC5 in counter mode. A better approach that would
yield a truly random nonce is to exploit process variations
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Fig. 8.

To simulate implantation in a human, we placed the WISP in a bag containing bacon and ground beef.

and omnipresent thermal noise by extracting random bits from
SRAM using the FERNS technique of Holcomb et al. [12].
Applying FERNS to 256 bytes of SRAM could yield 100 bits
of true randomness each time the SRAM is powered up. Our
work would benefit from an implementation of the memoryas-TRNG technique on the WISP.
Evaluation. We learned from our successful attacks that
private data transmitted between our ICD and programmer
are not encrypted. We propose that cryptography be added at
least at critical junctures. Encryption of the entire conversation
would be optimal — for example, a secure channel between
programmer and ICD could prevent third-party disclosure,
replay, and many other attacks — but in the interest of modularity we consider in this paper only defensive approaches
that might be implemented with less extensive modifications to
current ICD designs. Modularity aside, if we were to propose
cryptographic extensions that required significant changes to
ICD design, it would be necessary to consider the power cost
of our proposed changes. Without detailed knowledge of the
inner workings of ICDs, however, we cannot accurately assess
the cost of adding cryptography to existing devices.
The tension between increased security and increased power
consumption can be resolved by requiring successful zeropower authentication before the device switches to higher
power consumption modes. Our prototype shows that this
proposal is feasible for bootstrapping stronger (and possibly
mutual) authentication methods. Our prototype harvests power
from RF transmissions, performs a cryptographic authentication, and on successful authentication of a programmer, sets
a GPIO high which, if connected to or built into a real ICD,
would permit the ICD to participate in active RF communication and other higher-level protocols. This approach addresses
the risk of sleep deprivation torture described by Stajano and
Anderson [29].
Key management. This paper does not address the wellknown problem of key management. Using a shared secret
(called Km above) is reasonable for a prototype implementation, but a large-scale deployment of shared key material
— in implanted devices, hospitals, clinics, ambulances, IMD
programmers, and so on — may pose an unacceptable risk
because of the ease with which an unauthorized party could decrypt transmissions upon obtaining the key material. (Though
our recommendation of storing Km in secure hardware does

partially mitigate this risk under certain threat models.) The
simple scheme described above also fails to address revocation
of privilege and is therefore ill-suited to situations in which
key material might be compromised, although the proposed
system is still no less secure than the open-access model of
conventional systems. An SKEYS [9] or key-regression [6]
approach, with periodic updates of programmer keys, might
mitigate the time-window in which an attacker can use compromised keys while also not significantly changing the overall
model. Furthermore, the offline nature of the transactions that
must be secured — imagine an ambulance reaching an ICD
patient in a remote setting — further complicates the problem
of key management and revocation.
In the context of medical devices, security-related design choices must balance security, privacy, safety, and efficacy [10]. An ideal key management scheme for this context,
which we present as an important open problem, must provide
security and support privacy without hindering the operation
of medical devices that are already known to provide safe and
effective treatments.
C. Zero-Power Sensible Key Exchange
We now present a key-distribution technique that complements both of our previous defensive techniques: distribution
of a symmetric cryptographic key over a human-perceptible
sensory channel. The primary goal is to allow the patient to
detect a key exchange while it occurs.
Approach. The programmer initiates our protocol by supplying an unmodulated RF carrier signal that could power the
passive component of the IMD. The IMD then generates a
random value to be used as a session key and broadcasts
it as a modulated sound wave. The amplitude of this sound
wave is such that it can be easily received and demodulated
by a reader with a microphone in contact with the patient’s
body near the implantation site, but it cannot be heard over
background noise at any appreciable distance from the patient,
at least not without dedicated sensing equipment. The close
proximity this enforces further ensures patient awareness and
consent to the authentication attempt. Once key exchange has
been performed, RF communication can safely occur over a
longer range without fear of eavesdropping.
Evaluation. We implemented our key exchange mechanism
on the WISP using as carrier frequency the same 4 kHz
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Fig. 9. Zero-power sensible key exchange: a nonce is transmitted
from the ICD to the programmer using acoustic waves. It can be clearly
picked up only if the programmer is in contact with the patient’s body
near the implantation site, and can be used as the secret key in the
authentication protocol from the previous section. (1 cm is a typical
implantation depth. Diagram is not to scale.)

audible and tactile signal discussed above. To effect key
exchange, we used the same modulation scheme currently
in use by our reader (2-FSK). We achieved a baud rate of
310 Bd, permitting transmission of a 128-bit nonce in 0.4 s.
The components performed key exchange without drawing
power from a battery, and the exchange was clearly audible,
measuring 75 dB SPL through a human hand. When the
microphone was not in contact with the skin, the sound pickup
was too low to be measured on our meter (< 60 dB SPL). In
our ad hoc experiments, transmission of the key was easy
to feel with the hand, but difficult to hear at a distance.
While these preliminary measurements show the plausibility
of making eavesdropping difficult, further work is necessary to
illuminate the relationship between sound levels and the ability
to eavesdrop. Furthermore, an adversary may attempt to eavesdrop on the electromagnetic emanations [14] of the electrical
components that generate the sound rather than on the sound
itself. Radio shielding in the form of a Faraday cage or use of
non-electromagnetic, optical links between security-sensitive
modules may help to reduce these unintended emanations. An
alternate approach for sensible key exchange might be for the
programmer to transmit the key to the IMD over an audio
channel, or for the final key to be derived from keys sent in
both directions.
VI. C ONCLUSION AND F UTURE W ORK
Our investigation shows that an implantable cardioverter
defibrillator (1) is potentially susceptible to malicious attacks
that violate the privacy of patient information and medical
telemetry, and (2) may experience malicious alteration to the
integrity of information or state, including patient data and
therapy settings for when and how shocks are administered.
Moreover, standard approaches for security and access control
may not always be suitable for IMDs due to tensions between
security (e.g., access for pre-authorized parties only) and safety
(e.g., access for previously unauthorized parties in emergency
circumstances) [10]. Our three new methods for zero-power
security (zero-power notification, zero-power authentication,

Fig. 10. The protocol for communication between an ICD programmer
and a zero-power authentication device (a WISP RFID tag, in the case
of our prototype).

and sensible key exchange) implemented on a prototype are
steps toward mitigating this tension without simultaneously
drawing power from a battery.
Reflections on existing and next-generation IMD technologies. Evaluating the security and privacy of an IMD best
leverages skills from many disciplines, including security,
cryptography, cardiology, signal processing, radio communications, and antenna design. Next-generation IMDs, which may
incorporate greater communications capabilities and be more
networked, should not rely solely upon external mechanisms
like firewalls on external devices and controlled distribution of
commercial programmers. Firewalls on wireless programmers
or Internet-connected at-home monitors do not immediately
protect the wireless links themselves and may not protect the
integrity of communications. Controlled distribution of programmers cannot prevent insider access, and the availability
of software radios can make the possession of a commercial
wireless reprogrammer unnecessary. In essence, device manufacturers should not view external devices, like commercial
programmers, as part of the trusted computing base for IMDs.
Additionally, the trend toward increasing nominal read range
allows flexible home monitoring for better safety, but it also
increases the exposure of devices to attacks from nearby
adversaries. Finally, for economic and safety reasons, certain
IMDs typically contain non-rechargeable batteries and require
surgery for replacement. Conventional approaches for security
and privacy may facilitate trivial denial of service attacks
against these batteries.
Future directions and open problems. Critical systems that
rely on computing devices are already designed with great
care. When these systems include wireless computing devices,
additional precautions are necessary to ensure that the computing devices appropriately balance safety with convenience and
do not introduce unacceptable risks. Medical device design is
one such situation. Our research into implantable cardioverter
defibrillators has demonstrated failure modes that do not
appear to be addressed by some present-day design strategies
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and certification processes.
Our work therefore leaves open a number of research
problems. While there are a few obvious minor next steps,
our research calls for much broader and innovative action. In
concert with Halperin et al. [10], this work illuminates the
need for a principled and deeper investigation into prevention
mechanisms, detection mechanisms, audit mechanisms, deterrents, and methods that enhance patient awareness and ensure
consent. Moreover, a fundamental challenge will be to develop
methods that appropriately balance security and privacy with
traditional goals such as safety and effectiveness. Our work
provides a foundation for these explorations, on top of which
we hope to see much subsequent innovation. Such innovations
will become more crucial as the technologies and capabilities
of implantable medical devices continue to evolve.
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